The limits of mathematical computability have been set solely by mathematical logic and reasoning until now. Taking the view that information is after all physical, however, we argue that physics, particularly quantum physics, could help extend the notion of computability. Here, we list the important and unique features of quantum mechanics in intrinsic randomness and implied infinity. We then outline a quantum mechanical "algorithm" for one of the insoluble problems of mathematics, the Hilbert's tenth and equivalently the Turing halting problem. The key element of this algorithm is the computability and measurability of both the values of physical observables and of the quantum-mechanical probability distributions for these values. The algorithm, as it stands, has its limit as it cannot solve non-computable problems of other classes different than that of Turing halting problem. But it provides an interesting and new perspective that computability, and with it the limits of Mathematics, ought to be determined not solely by Mathematics itself but also by Physical Principles. *
Introduction
Ever since the inception of the universal Turing computer-simple but yet encompassingly powerful-some 70 years ago, there have been continuing efforts after efforts to understand its power, its limitation and to extend computation beyond such limitation.
Supported by the convergence of many seemingly different models of computation put forward independently by Turing, Post, Markov and others [3] , a thesis on the notion of computability has been formed and gained much credibility. The Church-Turing thesis, or more precisely the Thesis M [4] (M for Machine or Maximality), which can be phrased as
Every function which would naturally be regarded as computable can be computed by a universal Turing machine.
This is neither a theorem nor a conjecture, for it is not and cannot even be hoped to be proven. It has the status of a thesis and is similar to a scientific/physical theory in that they both can be proved wrong with newly gathered evidence but can never be proved right just by logic itself-a fact pointed out by Popper for all scientific theories. The thesis simply asserts some correspondence between certain informal concept, that of computability in this case, with certain logically well-defined (i.e. mathematical) object, namely, the universal Turing machine. (At the risk of belittling this important thesis, we might want to illustrate the status of a thesis by a ridiculous example: "Every man-made object which can be flown can be flown by a Boeing," which obviously equates the notion of flyability with, and limits it to, being flown by a well-defined machine.)
The thesis M thus imposes an upper limit of what any computing machine can be designed to do: no more than the universal Turing machine, it asserts. The support the thesis has is the convergence of many, in fact all, apparently different classical computation models. The reason for this convergence, we speculate, is that all these models share the same mathematical foundation which is classical logic. If our speculation is right, and we have more evidence in the below, then two implications would follow immediately: (i) the limit of computability expressed by the thesis is also a manifestation of the limit of classical logic itself, and (ii) to push the notion of computability any further, one would have to move beyond classical logic.
Can this computability notion be enlarged? In principles, there is no reason why not. Proposals to overcome the Turing-machine limit range from the models of mathematical principles such as continuous valued neural networks [5] , DNA computing [6] to those of physical nature based on general arguments [7] , relativity principles, and quantum mechanical principles [8, 9, 10, 11] .
We summarise a quantum computing model in this paper and discuss its implications. But first we present a mathematically noncomputable function in the next section and argue in the following sections how it can be resolved in the quantum framework.
Classical noncomputable 2.1 The Turing halting function
The widely-accepted thesis on computability of the last section concerns about computable functions. For the noncomputable, an important example is the Turing halting problem (which is actually first presented by Martin Davis [12] ).
The halting problem for Turing machines is a manifestation of undecidability: a Turing computation is equivalent to the evaluation of a partial recursive function, which is only defined for a subset of the integers. As this domain is classically undecidable, one cannot always tell in advance whether the Turing machine will halt (that is, whether the input is in the domain of the partial recursive function) or not (when the input is not in the domain).
A version of the proof of the unsolvability of the halting problem based on the Cantor diagonal argument, a type of reductio ad absurdum, goes as follows. The proof is by contradiction with the assumption of the existence of a computable halting function h(p, i) which has two integer arguments -p is the Gödel encoded integer number for the algorithm and i is its (encoded) integer input:
One can then construct a program r(n) having one integer argument n in such a way that it calls the function h(n, n) as a subroutine and r(n) halts if h(n, n) = 1 r(n) loops infinitely (i.e., never stops) otherwise.
The application of the halting function h on the program r and input n results in
A contradiction is clearly manifest once we put n = r in the last equation above.
The construction of such a program r is transparently possible, unless the existence of a computable h is wrongly assumed. Thus the contradiction discounts the assumption that there is a classically algorithmic way to determine whether any arbitrarily given program with arbitrary input will halt or not.
This kind of proof does not rule out altogether the existence of some halting functions whose computability is suitably re-defined. This is similar to the way paradoxes are resolved and is indeed the case we will argue for in the next section.
Getting around the arguments of reductio ad absurdum
The contradiction arguments above against the existence of a computable halting function can be avoided if we redefine what it means by computable and, based on that redefinition, distinguish and separate the two classes of quantum and classical computable functions (i.e. algorithms).
A quantum function qh(p, i), similar to eq. (1), can conceivably exist to determine whether any classical program p will halt on any classical input i or not. The contradiction in eq. (2) would be avoided if the quantum halting qh cannot take as an argument the modified program r, which is now of quantum character because it now has quantum qh as a subroutine. This will be the case if qh can only accept integers while quantum algorithms themselves, with proper definitions, cannot in general be themselves encoded as integers (similar to the situation of real numbers not being able to be mapped into integers). It is clear that even the case of a simple superimposed state α|0 + β|1 cannot be encoded as integers for all complex-valued α and β -simply because of the difference in cardinalities between real/complex numbers and integers. Furthermore, the no-cloning theorem [13] of quantum mechanics does restrict the type of operations, which must all be unitary, available to and of input admissible for quantum algorithms.
In essence, the way we will break the self-referential reasoning here by the differentiation between quantum and classical algorithms is similar to the way Bertrand Russell resolved the set theory paradox (to do with "The set of all sets which are not members of themselves") by the introduction of classes as distinct from sets. (For other lines of arguments, see [14, 7, 10] .) But here, we will have to appeal to both logical manipulations and physical principles (those of Quantum Mechanics) in order to compute the noncomputable.
Quantum principles
So, what are the extra-logical features of Quantum Mechanics that would enable an enlargement of computability?
We summarise below the quantum properties and principles that are needed for such a task. Following Feynman, we will employ the gedanken "simple" two-slit experiment, Figure 1 , to point out all that can and cannot be known about, but will be manifest in A B Figure 1 : Plane-wave electrons passing through the two slits from the top to arrive at the screen at the bottom: (A) The intensity pattern on the screen shows no interference (continuous curve) when there is some mechanism to detect which slit the electrons have passed through (dashed curves are the intensities obtained when the other slit is closed); (B) Interference is clearly exhibited in the intensity pattern on the screen when no record is kept of which slit the electrons have passed through. the weird reality of quantum physics. This thought experiment is about a plane wave of electrons -all of the electrons in which have a single, well-defined value for the momentum -passing through two slits one by one before arriving at a detection screen where each electron can be recorded at a definite position on the screen and at a definite moment in (laboratory) time.
Intrinsic randomness
One important property of Quantum Mechanics is the randomness in the outcome of a quantum measurement. Even if we prepare the initial quantum states to be exactly the same in principle, (say, the plane-wave state for the electrons) we can still have different and random outcomes in subsequent measurements (like finding out which slit of the two that an electron so prepared would go through, or where the electron would land on the final screen). Such randomness is a fact of life in the quantum reality of our universe.
To reflect that intrinsic and inevitable randomness, the best that Quantum Mechanics, as a physical theory of nature, can do is to list, given the initial conditions, the possible values for measured quantities and the probability distributions for those values. Both the values and the probability distributions are computable in the sense that they can be evaluated algorithmically to any desirable accuracy [15] . (Otherwise, without such computability, Quantum Mechanics would hardly be useful as a physical theory.) This definition of computability of a number when it can be evaluated to any degree of accuracy is sufficient to interpret the number and to establish its relationship with other numbers. And that all we need in computing any number: its place in relation to other numbers.
On the other hand, not only the values registered in the measurement of some measurable but also the associated probability distributions are measurable in the sense that they can be obtained to any desirable accuracy by the act of physical measurements [15] . Normally, the values for measurable are quantised so they can be obtained exactly; the probability distributions are real numbers but can be obtained to any given accuracy by repeating the measurements again and again (each time from the same initial quantum state) until the desired statistics can be reached.
That is how the computable numbers from Quantum Mechanics can be judged against the measurable numbers obtained from physical experiments. Thus far, there is no evidence of any discrepancy between theory and experiments.
Implied infinity
Randomness is, by mathematical definition, incompressible and irreducible. In Algorithmic Information Theory, Chaitin [16] defines randomness by program-size complexity: a binary string is considered random when the size of the shortest program that generates that string is not "smaller" than the size of the string itself. We refer the readers to the original literature for more technically precise definitions for the cases of finite and infinite strings.
Another way to see that randomness does entail infinity is given by an interesting argument by Stannett [7] based on König's Lemma which states that any finitely-branching tree which contains infinitely many terminal nodes must also contain an infinite path. It is pointed out that a classical algorithm which could generate a truly random binary sequence must contain infinitely many terminal nodes (c.f. the program-size definition for randomness). If this algorithm is recursive then it is possible that it may run forever without halting (that is, along the infinite path enabled by the König's Lemma) in the generation of some single digit of the sequence. As such, the algorithm does not really exist, for it cannot really generate a sequence if it is stuck indefinitely at the generation of some intermediate bit somewhere in the sequence.
In sharp contrast, we can exploit Nature to generate an infinite binary sequence which is random just by, say, repeatedly detecting which of the two slits (hence the binary valuedness) the plane-wave electron goes through one by one 1 . Thus, paradoxically, the quantum reality of Nature somehow allows us to compress the infinitely incompressible randomness into the apparently finite act of preparing the same quantum state over and over again for subsequent measurements! 2 Infiniteness implied by randomness is not, however, the only implied infinity that is embraced by quantum reality. Quantum Mechanics suggests that an electron would explore an infinite number of paths in going from one point to another (say, from one slit to a point on the screen, in which case an infinity is somehow "contained" in the finite distance between the slit and the screen!). This infinite multiplicity of the paths taken forms the basis for Feynman path integral formulation of Quantum Mechanics. An infinity within the finite would normally entail inconsistency -or so would one deduce from mathematical logic. Amazingly, quantum reality manages to maintain the required consistency by changing the outcome of the measurement as soon as we try to detect/confirm the infinity by identifying the paths taken in between the finite separation. This can be illustrated by and is in fact born out in the entirely different pattern (of no interference, see (A) in Fig. 1 .) which will be recorded on the screen if we try to detect which of the two slits the electrons have gone through on their way there.
The quantum mechanically implied infinity is needed for and consistent with the finitely measured!
Quantum logic
The above peculiar properties of intrinsic randomness and implied infinity in quantum reality can be captured and manifest in the peculiarity of Quantum Logic. In contrast to the classical logic of propositional calculus, quantum propositions A, B and C (each has a value of being either TRUE or FALSE) do not in general satisfy the distributivity or modularity property [17] ; that is,
An heuristic example of this inequality can also be found in the gedanken two-slit experiment if we label the propositions as
• A: the detection of an electron at a position x on the final screen;
• B: the detection of an electron passing through one particular slit (say, the left slit in Fig. 1 ) on its way to the final screen;
• C: the detection of an electron passing through the other slit on its way to the final screen.
With these choices and with the assumption that the electron intensity is low enough such that on average the electrons arrive at the screen one by one (i.e. no coincidence in the detection), the lhs of (3) represents the detection of an electron at a position x on the screen without ever knowing which slit it has gone through to get there. On the other hand, the rhs of (3) represents the detection of an electron at a position x on the screen when it is known which slit of the two it definitely has passed through on its way there.
The former case experimentally gives rise to an interference pattern on the screen, built up by the electrons one by one as in (B) of Fig .1 . The latter gives rise to a non-interference pattern as in (A) of Fig .1 , and thus is distinguishable from the former. In particular, we can find a position x on the screen where no electron is ever detected if we have interference (that is, at the node of interference pattern). For this position x the truth value of the combined proposition on the lhs of (3) is thus FALSE; while that of the rhs is TRUE. We then have the inequality in (3).
We leave Quantum Logic here. This subject is not fully developed and will have to wait for further developments in the long-standing problems of Quantum Decoherence and Quantum Measurement, to which Quantum Logic is intimately connected (because of the way the truth-value assignments for propositions are ultimately specified by empirical measurements).
A quantum algorithm
Instead of the Turing halting problem, we will consider the equivalent Hilbert's tenth problem [18, 19] . This latter problem, appropriately rephrased, asks for a general algorithm to determine if any given Diophantine equation has a (non-negative) integer solution or not. A Diophantine equation involves polynomial equation of many unknowns and integer coefficients. If we can find a general algorithm asked for by the Hilbert's tenth problem then we will have a general algorithm for the Turing halting problem; that is, we will be able to tell if any given Turing program will halt or not upon starting with some input.
Classically, there is no such algorithm as shown by the Cantor's diagonal arguments presented in a previous section. For this particular Hilbert's tenth problem, we can see that its noncomputability originates from the lack of a general method to verify a negative statement concerning solution of a Diophantine equation. By direct substitution into the Diophantine polynomial, it is straightforward to verify whether a set of integers is indeed a zero of the polynomial as it is claimed or not. But it is, however, impossible to mathematically verify in general a negative statement that a Diophantine polynomial has no zero. For a particular equation, such as the Diophantine equation of the Fermat's last theorem, one may be able to find a specific way to confirm that the equation has no solution. But that specific way is peculiar and only applicable to the equation in consideration, or some related equations, and not to any Diophantine equations in general. The only most general way would be to check all the integers themselves; obviously, this is not a finite task and thus is not an implementable algorithm.
On the other hand, a quantum algorithm has been proposed recently [8, 9] for the Hilbert's tenth problem. We will summarise the main points of the algorithm below and only wish to mention here that we consider quantum algorithms in general are as good as any algorithms in the sense that they can be implementable in the physical world, occupying finite time duration and finite spatial extent and consuming finite physical resources.
Outlines
Our strategy is that we do not look for the zeroes of the Diophantine polynomial in question, which may not exist, but instead search within the domain of non-negative integers for the absolute minimum of the square of the polynomial, which always exists and is finite. While it is equally hard to find either the zeroes or the absolute minimum in classical computation, we have converted the problem to the realisation of the ground state of a quantum Hamiltonian and there is no known quantum principle against such an act.
In fact, there is no known physical principles against it. Let us consider the three laws of thermodynamics concerning energy conservation, entropy of closed systems and the unattainability of absolute zero temperature. The energy involved in our algorithm is finite, being the ground state energy of some Hamiltonian. The entropy increase which ultimately connects to decoherence effects is a technical problem for all quantum computation in general.
It may appear that even the quantum process can only explore a finite domain in a finite time and is thus no better than a classical machine in terms of computability. But there is a crucial difference.
In a classical search, even if the global minimum is encountered, it cannot generally be proved that it is the global minimum (unless it is a zero of the Diophantine equation). Armed only with mathematical logic, we would still have to compare it with all other numbers from the infinite domain yet to come, but we obviously can never complete this comparison in finite time -thus, mathematical noncomputability.
In the quantum case, the global minimum is encoded in the energy of the ground state of a suitable Hamiltonian. Then, by energetic tagging, the global minimum can be found in finite time and confirmed, if it is the ground state that is obtained at the end of the computation. It is the physical principles that can be utilised to identify and/or verify the ground state. These principles are over and above the mathematics which govern the logic of a classical machine and help differentiate the quantum from the classical. Quantum mechanics could "explore" an infinite domain, but only in the sense that it can select, among an infinite number of states, one single state (or a subspace in case of degeneracy) to be identified as the ground state of some given Hamiltonian (which is bounded from below). This "sorting" can be done thanks to physical principles which are not available to mathematical computability.
Our proposal is in contrast to the claim in [20] that quantum Turing machines compute exactly the same class of functions as do Turing machines, albeit perhaps more efficiently. The quantum Turing machine approach considered there is a direct generalisation of that of the classical Turing machines but with qubits and some universal set of one-qubit and twoqubit unitary gates to build up, step by step, dimensionally larger, but still dimensionally finite unitary operations. This universal set is chosen on its ability to evaluate any desirable classical logic function. Our approach, on the other hand, is from the start based on infinitedimension Hamiltonians and also based on the special properties and unique status of their ground states. The unitary operations are then followed as the Schrödinger time evolutions.
Verification of the ground state
The quantum algorithm is based on the key ingredients of:
• The exactitude, to the level required, of the theory of Quantum Mechanics in describing and predicting physical processes.
• Our ability to physically implement certain Hamiltonians having infinite numbers of energy levels;
• Our ability to physically obtain and verify some state as the desirable ground state;
If any of these is not achievable or approximable with controllable accuracy, the quantum algorithm simply fails and further modifications may or may not work. Without any known physical principles outlawing these key assumptions, we sketch here an approach to obtain and verify the desirable ground state of the Hamiltonian corresponding to the Diophantine polynomial in consideration.
It is in general easier to implement some Hamiltonian than to obtain its ground state. We thus should start the computation in yet a different and readily obtainable initial ground state, |g I , of some initial Hamiltonian, H I , then deform this Hamiltonian in a time T into the Hamiltonian whose ground state is the desired one, through a time-dependent process represented by the interpolating Hamiltonian H(t/T ).
In order to solve the Hilbert's tenth problem we need on the one hand such timedependent physical (adiabatic) processes to arrive at a candidate state. On the other hand, the theory of Quantum Mechanics can be used to verify whether this candidate is the ground state through the usual statistical predictions from the Schrödinger equation with a truncated number of energy states of the time-dependent Hamiltonian H(t/T ). This way, we can overcome the problem of which states are to be included in the truncated basis for a numerical study of Quantum Mechanics. This also reconciles with the Cantor diagonal arguments which state that the problem could not be solved entirely in the framework of classical computation.
The key factor in the ground state verification is the probability distributions, which are both computable from a numerical study of Quantum Mechanics (that is, with the control in the calculation to reach any desirable accuracy) and measurable in practice (i.e., by repeating the physical processes to obtain the statistics to any desirable accuracy). By matching the calculated with the measured, both of which depend on the evolution time which we can vary, we then can unambiguously identify the ground state of the final Hamiltonian. The information about the existence of solution, or lack of it, for the given Diophantine polynomial can be inferred through some further quantum measurements on this ground state.
It is worth noting that we have here a peculiar situation in which the computational complexity, that is, the evolution time, might not be known exactly before carrying out the quantum computation -although it can be estimated approximately.
Implications

When is a proof a proof?
Proof, be it mathematical or general, is the means to an end: a proof is there to explain, convince or persuade the others (and even oneself) the "truthful" value of certain statement(s).
A classical proof, based on classical logic, starts with a finite number of axioms from which a finite number of subsequent/intermediate statements can be derived with the help of a finite number of inference rules. And it ends with a final statement, the "truth". All these finiteness requirements are there to ensure the reproducibility of the proof in a finite time and manner. A classical algorithm is a particular case of such a type of proof, with input being (part of) the axioms and output the final "truth".
Deutsch and some others [2, 21] see such a classical proof/algorithm as an object, static with intermediate records. On the other hand and in contrast, quantum algorithms are seen as dynamical processes wherein the intermediate "steps" cannot be recorded without destroying the interference and thus the algorithms themselves. The intermediate quantum "steps", as a matter of facts, cannot be even made out as clearly defined, discrete steps, expressible in terms of classical propositions.
The requirement of finiteness of the number of intermediate steps in a classical proof is no longer relevant (and unobtainable in a quantum proof anyway) if consistency is maintainable and reproducibility is achievable in quantum "proofs".
For such quantum proofs to be credible, they must be consistent: a statement and its negation cannot be proved at the same time under the same conditions. In basing the notion of proof on the physical reality, the condition of consistency should be automatically and implicitly guaranteed, for after all there is only one reality -or at most one which we can perceive. Signs of inconsistency would not be pointing to something intrinsic of the reality, but would be only because of our perception or understanding of reality. In other words, inconsistency, as we see it, cannot refute the reality; it only hints that it is time we need a new theory of Nature, which in turn may or may not affect the "proof."
For such quantum proofs to be of some usefulness, they must be reproducible: reproducible in a finite duration of time, reproducible in at different locations and reproducible at different times. The latter two requirements are ensured by the principles of invariance under spatial and temporal translations, which are some of the most cherished physical principles. These principles can be tested, and have been tested extensively to the highest accuracy without any failures, via their consequences in the conservation of energy and linear momentum.
But can they, the quantum proofs, be acceptable as proofs? We would prefer an affirmative answer even though the answer to this question might only be a matter of taste.
It should be easier to accept a quantum process a proof if the end result of the quantum process can be verified by classical means -for instance, in a factoring problem, the obtained primes can be easily multiplied together to give back the original number as a check. Similarly, a quantum process should also be acceptable as a valid proof even if such direct verification cannot be carried out as a matter of principle but the result somehow can be verified indirectly through some physical handles. This is the case of our algorithm for Hilbert's tenth problem above where we only need to verify that some state is indeed the ground state, a physical attribute only indirectly linked to the mathematical solutions sought.
The authors whose quotation is cited at the beginning of this article have also argued that even when, as a matter of principles, there is no direct nor indirect verifications possible, quantum process should still be considered as valid means of proof, simply because of "our acceptance of the physical laws underlying the computing operations."
Limits of quantum algorithms
Generalised noncomputability and undecidability set the boundary for computation carried out by mechanical (including quantum mechanical) processes, and in doing so help us to understand much better what can be so computed. With this in mind, we mention here the results of some considerations [9] about some modified version of the Hilbert's tenth problem and the computation of Chaitin's Ω number [16] . These problems are all interrelated through questions about existence of solutions of Diophantine equations.
Beside the question raised in the Hilbert's tenth problem, we can also ask different questions [19] whether some Diophantine equation has a finite number of non-negative integer solutions (including the case in which it has no solution) or an infinite number, or whether the number of solutions is even, etc ... In general, we cannot tell the degree of degeneracy for the ground state of some quantum mechanical Hamiltonian; but with some modifications, the quantum algorithm above for the Hilbert's tenth problem can be generalised to tackle this new class of questions. The possibility of such a generalisation confirms the mathematical equivalence between the Hilbert's tenth problem and problems in this new class.
Besides the above equivalent to the Turing halting problem, there are yet others which belong to different classes in the non-computability hierarchy. The most famous of all must be the Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem. It establishes that any finitely axiomatic, consistent mathematical system sufficiently complex to embrace Arithmetic must be incomplete -that is, there exist some statements which cannot be confirmed or denied from within the system by sheer logic, resulting in undecidability. (Interestingly, it is precisely the statement about consistency of the system that is neither provable nor deniable.) We can see that this undecidability is more than that of Turing machines, whose applicable mathematical statements can only have bounded universal quantifiers as opposed to arbitrarily unbounded universal quantifiers of Arithmetic at large.
Chaitin, approaching from the perspectives of Algorithmic Information Theory [16] , has shown that there exist many unprovable statements in Arithmetic simply because they have irreducible algorithmic contents, measurable in bits, that are more than the complexity, also measurable in bits, of the finite set of axioms and inference rules of the system. Infinitely irreducible algorithmic complexity is randomness which exists even in pure mathematics. And more frustratingly, we can never prove randomness since we could only ever deal with finite axiomatic complexity. Chaitin, to illustrate the point, has introduced the number Ω as the halting probability for a random program, with some random input, being emulated by a particular Turing machine. Ω is an average measure over all programs run on this particular universal Turing machine. This number, which is machine dependent, has many interesting properties, and has been generalised to a quantum version [14] . We only mention here the linkage between this number and polynomial Diophantine equations. When expressed in binary, the value of the k-th bit of Ω is 0 or 1 depending on whether some Diophantine equation, corresponding to the Turing machine in consideration,
for a given k > 0, has solutions in non-negative integers (x 1 , ..., x K ) for finitely or infinitely many values of the parameter N > 0. From this Diophantine representation we can see that the noncomputability of Ω is "more" than the noncomputability of the Turing halting problem. Even if, somehow, we have an algorithm for the latter to decide the equations in (4) for each N respectively, we would still need to apply the algorithm for an infinite number of times just to get a single digit for Ω! An infinite number of times cannot be normally performed in a finite time, hence the different class of noncomputability from that of the Turing halting problem.
In fact, to evaluate the Chaitin's Ω number in the quantum computation, we have to appeal to the hypothetical ability to physically construct quantum Hamiltonians involving a countably infinite number of dynamical degrees. That is, we would have to assume that we possess the unproven and untested ability to create or simulate Hamiltonians in Quantum Field Theory. The difficulty we encounter for the Ω number is nothing but another manifestation of the different classes in the hierarchy of classical noncomputability: on the one hand, the evaluation of this number is as classically noncomputable as the completeness of Arithmetic; on the other hand, Gödel's Incompleteness is known to be "more" noncomputable than the Hilbert's tenth problem.
Thus, even if Quantum Principles could help solve some mathematical noncomputables, there seem to exist further problems in the infinite hierarchy of noncomputables that may not be solved within the quantum framework.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we review the important characters of Quantum Principles and put forward the arguments that these physical principles may help compute some of the mathematically noncomputable. We also sketch the outline of a recently proposed quantum algorithm for the Hilbert's tenth problem, and emphasise the key role of probability distributions in the crucial verification, of a physical nature, for the solution for this classically and mathematically noncomputable problem. After all, all that the theory of Quantum Mechanics can offer are the possible values of observables and the probability distributions for these values. And we exhaust and need both in our quantum algorithm.
It remains to be seen if and when the quantum algorithm can be physically realised. If not prohibited by any physical principles, and we know none so far, then we trust that it can be implementable and will be realisable. If prohibited, on the other hand, because of some reason then we will have found a new physical principle. Whatever the case it may turn out to be, our investigation has already opened up new and interesting directions for Mathematics itself. Our quantum algorithm has inspired a reformulation of the Hilbert's tenth problem, a problem in the domain of the discrete integers, in terms of a set of infinitely coupled differential equations over continuous variables [22] . This may lead to new insights and/or solution of the problem (recalled that, despite the mathematical noncomputability of Hilbert's tenth problem, there does exist a general procedure to decide whether any given polynomial with many unknowns and real (continuous) coefficients has real solutions or not [23] . ) We also discuss the limitation of quantum algorithms and some implications of such quantum processes on the notion of mathematical proof. However, our decidability study here in the framework of Quantum Mechanics only deals with the property of being Diophantine, which does not cover the property of being arithmetic in general (which could involve unbounded universal quantifiers). This has the consequence that our consideration has no direct consequences on Gödel's Incompleteness theorem. However, it is conceivable that Gödel's theorem may lose its restrictive power once the concept of mathematical proof is, once again, suitably generalised with quantum principles.
